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Abstract
After the infamous cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and the Ukrainian conflict in 
2014–2015, the Russian military theory, and in par ticular, Information Warfare (IW) 
doctrines, have come into the centre of attention. IW has played a very peculiar role 
in the Russian political and military theory and practice, and its current state can be 
regarded as a climax in its evolution. To gain an in-depth understanding of the Russian 
strategic thinking, the first part of this article strives to give an account of the unique 
nature of the Russian way of IW.
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Absztrakt
Az Észtország elleni hírhedt számítógépes támadásokat követően, és különösen az ukraj-
nai konfliktus után az orosz katonai elmélet és az Információs Hadviselés (IH) a figyelem 
középpontjába került. Az orosz katonai és stratégiai gondolkodás megértéséhez e területek 
mélyreható vizsgálata szükséges. Az IH rendkívül sajátos szerepet játszik az orosz politi-
kai és katonai elméletben és gyakorlatban, és jelenlegi állapotát a ciklikus megújuláson 
átesett fejlesztések csúcspontjának tekinthetjük. Jelen tanulmány első része arra irányul, 
hogy betekintést nyújtson ezen fejlődési folyamat kezdeti szakaszába, amely az orosz IH 
kialakulásának – és azon belül a kiberműveletek értelmezésének – egyedülálló jellegét adja.
Kulcsszavak: információs háború, stratégiai művészet, információs tér, reflexív kontroll
Introduction
In the period after the cyberattack against Estonia in 2007 as well as after the Ukrainian 
conflict in 2014–2015, Russian military theory and Information Warfare (IW) doctrines, 
in particular, have come into the limelight. To gain an in-depth understanding of the 
Russian military and security policy thinking, analysts have turned to a wide variety 
of strategic sources. Going beyond the analysis of each primary strategic or doctrinal 
source separately, strategic theory or operational art examines a corpus of sources and 
contextual factors to identify how the nature and character of warfare2 is evolving in 
light of, for example, pervasive technological development, and what kind of stra-
tegic, organisational and capability adjustments this requires on the national level. 
Each nation has its distinctive interpretation. In terms of Russia, Dmitry Adamsky, 
an Israeli strategic scientist of Russian origin explains this comprehensive approach 
as operational art: “In Russian military science, the term operational art is a sphere 
of military affairs interconnecting strategy and tactics, and it also means the theory 
and practice of achieving strategic goals through design, organization, and conduct of 
campaigns, operations, and battles. The theory of operational art explores change and 
continuity in the current character of war and highlights the most optimal concept 
of operations, organizational structures, and weaponry for a given historical period.”3
Similarly, this article also aims to provide a longitudinal overview of the IW related 
trends and developments in Russian operational art with a focus on the main distinctive 
elements that determine the peculiar Russian way. As for Western IW thinking, the 
U.S. has a foundational role, this will be used as a basis of comparison. The analysis is 
based on primary sources that are strategic and doctrinal documents which abound 
from 2000 onwards, as the table below shows. The period before 2000, however, 
lacks publicly available primary sources, namely strategies or doctrines. Therefore, 
2 Baylis, John – Wirtz, James J. – Gray, Colin S.: Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2018.
3 Adamsky, Dmitry: Cross-Domain Coercion. The Current Russian Art of Strategy, The Institut Français des Relations In-
ternationales, Paris, 2015. www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf (Downloaded: 24.03.2019.)
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secondary military literature,4 i.e. the views of individual military and civilian experts 
including scholarly analyses will be scrutinised. In the selection of the sources, the 
main aim was to illustrate certain trends, rather than providing a full spectrum of 
military sources.
Table 1.  Russian national security and information security documents after 2000. 
2000 National Security Concept of Russia of the Russian Federation
2000 The (first) Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation
2008 National Security Strategy 2009–2020
2010 Military Doctrine
2011 Draft Convention on International Information Security
2011 Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
in the Information Space
2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
2013 Basic Principles for State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International 
Information Security
2014 Concept of Russia’s Cyber Security Strategy
2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation
2015 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation
2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation
2016 Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation
Source: Complied by the author
The Intellectual Origins and the Evolution of the Current 
Russian IW Concept
Even though the conceptualisation and the terminology according to the IW have 
been undergoing a continuous shift, just like in the U.S., the current version of the 
IW concept is much more the result of an evolutionary than a revolutionary process. 
Among others, Dmitry Adamsky points out that the stream of current Russian thinking 
in the so-called New Generation Warfare is to a large extent the direct outgrowth of 
the Military Technical Revolution (MTR)/Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) theori-
sation in the 1980s. That process was triggered by the rapid evolution and spread of 
information technology in the 1970s. In the Cold War years, this evolution influenced 
both Soviet and American leaders, thinkers and commanders. The Soviets conceived 
4 The elite military journal known in Russia as Voennaia Mysl’ is an organ of the Russian Defence Ministry, the journal’s 
contributors are top military personnel and leading lecturers from Russian military universities and colleges. The English 
translation of this journal is published under the title Military Thought.
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radio-electronic warfare as a way to interfere with an adversary’s communications 
channels and nodes, and ultimately his command and control on the battlefield.5
These ideas swiftly found validation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, after which the 
Pentagon managed the creation of DoD-wide policy to establish responsibilities for 
the new field of information warfare, first within the Command and Control Warfare 
framework. Information War was first used by the U.S. Department of Defense in 
a classified IW directive signed in 1992.6 Later on, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin 
Powell implemented the memorandum, but he made changes to it. In the Chairman’s 
memorandum, C2W would be “the military strategy that implements Information 
Warfare on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction”. Moreover, it also 
added psychological operations and military deception to the list of “principal military 
actions” supporting command and control warfare.7
With time, information war has been softened into Information Operations (IO) in 
Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Joint Publication 3-13), published on October 
1998. JP 3-13 sought to avoid a simple re-labelling of terms, and thus depicted IO as 
a broadening of IW, which now became a wartime tool: “IO conducted during time of 
crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific 
adversary or adversaries”.8 JP 3-13 designated six offensive and eight defensive assigned 
and supporting capabilities and activities. “These assigned and supporting capabilities 
and activities include, but are not limited to, operations security (OPSEC), military 
deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, 
and special information operations (SIO), and may include computer network attack.”9 
The 1998 JP also emphasised the necessity of obtaining and maintaining information 
superiority during IO. Information Superiority is defined as: “The capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”10 In JP 3-13 the set of Information 
Operations capabilities could include computer network operations (CNO).11
In 2003, the U.S. Army released its new and updated version of FM 3-13. It defined 
information operations as: “The employment of the core capabilities of electronic 
warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect 
or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision-making.”12
5 Warner, Michael: Notes on Military Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations in the United States, 1992–2014, The Cyber Defense 
Review, U.S. Army, USA, August 27, 2015. https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/
Article/1136012/notes-on-military-doctrine-for-cyberspace-operations-in-the-united-states-1992/ (Downloaded: 
15.05.2019.)
6 Atwood, Donald J.: Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Information Warfare”, Department of Defense Directive, 1992.
7 Warner (2015): op. cit.
8 Ibid.
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Ministry of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1998. www.c4i.
org/jp3_13.pdf (Downloaded: 25.04.2019.)
10 Ibid.
11 In JP 3-13, CNO comprises Computer Network Defense, Computer Network Exploitation and Computer Network Attack, 
which is defined as operations „to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”
12 Headquarters of the U.S. Army: FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Was-
hington, D.C., 2003. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-13-2003.pdf (Downloaded: 08.03.2019.)
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By 2006, the term cyber operations were given prime attention and started to 
gain separate doctrinal documents in the U.S. The National Military Strategy dated 
2004, but published in March 2005, recognised cyberspace as a domain of conflict. 
The 2006 edition of the Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations elevated 
CNO into the category of core IO capabilities, and in December a distinct, classified 
Cyber Operations doctrine have been signed. Cyberspace domain was defined as: 
“A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum 
to store, modify and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical 
infrastructures.”13
In the Soviet Union and Russia, IW and cyber concepts have taken a different 
developmental curve heavily influenced by longstanding traditions and socio-political 
conditions. Adamsky pointed out that the Soviet definition given to the science of 
cybernetics (“kibernetika”) has also left its mark on the Russian approach. “Seen as 
a discipline in the intersection of exact, social, and natural sciences, Soviet scientific 
society defined cybernetics as a science exploring the nature of creation, storage, 
transformation, utilization, and management of information and knowledge, in 
complex systems, machines, contiguous living organisms, or societies. In a nutshell, 
it is a discipline dealing with decision-making management of the highest order.”14
In Russia, the 1990s have been characterised by the baseline conceptualisation 
of IW. This is well reflected by the plurality of the terms related to IW. Still, the major 
defining elements of the Russian approach can be identified. One of the most often 
quoted experts of Russian strategy, Timothy Thomas gives a good summary of the notion: 
“In Russian, the war part of the term information war is translated as either ‘informatsionniya 
voyna, informatsionniya borba’, or ‘informatsionnoye protivoborstbo’. According to 
one source, the term ‘informatsionniya voyna’ is usually used in a wider sense by 
journalists rather than military professionals. The latter prefer the term ‘informatsionnoye 
protivoborstbo’, which also means information warfare [or informational conflict or 
struggle] and is already in use by some military sources, to include the General Staff 
Academy. ‘Informatsionniya borba’ is also used by military professionals, but how it 
is interpreted from the other two is unknown. It is still too difficult to say specifically 
which term will find a preference. This is another reason to start discussions with the 
Russians, to find a common language not only for this term but for many others.”15
Remaining at Russian terminology and capability categorisation, Russian military 
experts have divided IW capabilities into two major subdivisions from an early stage. As 
Timothy Thomas explains: “For example, threats in both Russia’s 2000 military doctrine, 
and in a year 2000 issue of the Russian defense complex journal Information Security, 
were listed as information-technical and information-psychological aspects of IO. In the 
latter journal, the information-technical confrontation was divided into technical intel-
ligence devices, means and measures for protecting the information, super high-frequency 
weapons, ultrasonic weapons, radio-electronic countermeasures, electromagnetic impulse 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff: Cyber Operations Doctrine, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2006.
14 Adamsky (2015): op. cit.
15 Thomas, Timothy L.: Russian Views on Information-based Warfare, Airpower Journal, (1996 Special edition).
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weapons, and special software and hardware. Information-psychological aspects included 
mass media, non-lethal weapons, psychotronic tools, and special pharmaceuticals.”16
Other examples show the indefinite nature of the components. Captain First 
Rank (Reserve) R. Bikkenin in 2003 gave a somewhat different grouping: under the 
information-technical aspects he listed the main targets of attack and defence as 
electronic assets, especially communications and telecommunications systems and 
the Internet. Other aspects of the information-technical component of information 
conflict included disinformation, maskirovka, intelligence, the science of cryptology 
and steganography. Bikkenin underlined that several new cryptographic algorithms 
have become widespread, particularly the RSA-algorithm and the El Gamal algorithm.17
Adamsky elaborates on the explanation of the roots of these two divisions: “The 
first source of influence is a Soviet MTR/RMA thesis from the 1980s that envisioned 
military organizations of the post-industrial era as reconnaissance-strike complexes. 
Accordingly, one can defeat the adversary not by kinetic destruction, but by disrupting 
decision-making processes within its system of systems, through electronic war-
fare (EW) strike on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. This became a source for the 
‘digital-technological’ impetus of the Russian approach. Second, since informational 
influence is aimed primarily at an adversary’s decision-making, the Russian approach 
is informed by the tradition of ‘active measures’ and maskirovka – one of the main 
virtues of the Soviet-Russian intelligence and military art – a repertoire of denial, 
deception, disinformation, propaganda, camouflage, and concealment. It aims to 
manipulate the adversary’s picture of reality and to produce favourable operational 
conditions for promoting one’s strategic goals. This became a basis for the ‘cogni-
tive-psychological’ motive.”18
The information-psychological elements have always been central in the Russian 
operational art, and in military and intelligence practice, and recently they have 
become even more emphatic. Military stratagem (voennaia khitrost’) has been a major 
component of military art since the Tsarist times and it has complemented, multiplied 
or substituted the use of force to achieve strategic results in military operations.19 
Reflexive control is often mentioned in connection with Russian subterfuge tactics. 
According to Timothy Thomas, reflexive control is a subject that has been studied in 
the Soviet Union and Russia for more than 40 years. The strategic centre of gravity 
is the perception, the consciousness and together with all these, the decision-making 
of the target. The main aim is to convey to the target specially prepared information 
to tilt or nudge him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the 
initiator of the action.20 The intent can be to dissuade or to deter the adversary from 
its intention to attack. Reflexive control can comprise a mix of tactics including 
16 Thomas, Timothy L.: Comparing US, Russian, and Chinese Information Operations Concepts, Foreign Military Studies 
Office, Fort Leavenworth, 2004a. www.dodccrp.org/events/2004_CCRTS/CD/papers/064.pdf (Downloaded: 05.05.2019.)
17 Ibid.
18 Adamsky (2015): op. cit.
19 Ibid.
20 Thomas, Timothy L.: Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2004b/2) 
237–256.
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maskirovka (disinformation, deception, concealment), lure, threat, IW (including 
cyber-attacks) among others.
Controlling the target audience by manipulating its perception is applied vis-à-vis 
the domestic population, as well. By contrast, in the U.S., Title 10 U.S. Code 2241 
prohibits the DoD from domestic publicity or propaganda. In case of Russia, this is 
commonly attributed to the continuation of the ideology and methodology of mass 
propaganda originating in the early twentieth century Bolshevik era and continuing 
through the Cold War political war and active measures. In modern times, for example, 
back in 1996 Timothy Thomas cites an interview with a Ministry of Defence civilian 
analyst who referred to information war or “Informatsionnoya Voyna” or information 
noting that: “Both a broad and narrow sense are inherent in the existing concept of 
information warfare. In the broad sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of 
the ‘cold war’ – countermeasures between two states implemented mainly in peace-
time with respect not only and not so much to the armed forces as much as to the 
civilian population and the people’s public/social awareness, to state administrative 
systems, production control systems, scientific control, cultural control, and so forth. 
It is namely in this sense that the information security of the individual, society, and 
state is usually understood... In the narrow sense, information warfare is one of the 
varieties of military activity/operations/actions (or the immediate preparation for 
them).”21 Another example from a decade later states that: “The main effort is con-
centrated on achieving political or diplomatic ends, and influencing the leadership and 
public opinion of foreign states, as well as international and regional organizations.”22
Consequently, in Russian operational art, the “information space” (“informatsion-
noye prostranstvo”) has been treated as a unified strategic environment for a long 
time. Russian Defence Ministry’s document entitled The Russian Federation Armed 
Forces’ Information Space Activities Concept (2011) defines “information space” as: 
“The sphere of activity related to shaping, creating, transmitting, using and storing 
information, which influences individual and social awareness, as well as the informa-
tion infrastructure and information in the strict sense.”23 Russian official references to 
“cyberspace” (“kiberprostranstvo”) had long occurred only in translations of foreign 
texts or references to U.S. cyber strikes. Unlike in the Western concept, where it is 
treated as a separate domain, the Russian notion of “kiberprostranstvo” is merely 
a subset of information space and it is inseparable from it. The Western notion of 
cyberspace, therefore, cannot be used interchangeably in Russian operational art.
However, due to the increasingly important role of cyber issues, the understanding 
of cyber operations has shifted towards the Western view in the Russian strategic 
dialogue over the last five–ten years. As a result, more and more Russian strategists 
believe that Russia must develop a strategy for IW and cyberwar based on both 
21 Thomas (1996): op. cit.
22 Donskov, Col. Yu. E.: The Place and Role of Special Information Operations in Resolving Military Conflicts, Military Thought, 
(2005/6) 30–34. http://militaryarticle.ru/voennaya-mysl/2005-vm/9555-mesto-i-rol-specialnyh-informacionnyh-ope-
racij-pri (Downloaded: 14.03.2019.)
23 The Russian Ministry of Defence: Kontseptsiya deyatel’nosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti informatsionnogo prost-
ranstva [Russian Federation Armed Forces’ Information Space Activities Concept], Moscow, 2011. https://eng.mil.ru/en/
science/publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle (Downloaded: 24.05.2018.)
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Russian and other foreign countries’ opinions on the matter. This process appears to 
be underway, as military journals are full of articles on the development of command 
and control issues that utilise both Russian and Western concepts.24
Conclusion
As a conclusion, it can be inferred that IW development in the Russian operational 
art might have been inspired by U.S. technological and doctrinal developments, 
nevertheless, it developed along a different and unique path, and as a result, gained 
a distinctive character. In the Western military theory and practice, the notion of IW 
is by far not as central as in the Russian version. In the West, even the terminology 
has morphed into Information Operations implying a more restricted use. In Russian 
thinking, after the role of kinetic measures has been reduced considerably, IW has 
turned into the major tool to achieve strategic military and political goals. In that 
sense, the informational strike is about breaking the internal coherence of the enemy 
system and not about its integral annihilation.
To relate the Russian capabilities to the Western notion of cyberspace, Russia has 
focused predominantly on the cognitive or social layer, while the U.S. has prioritised 
the physical and logical layers.
This peculiar development to a large extent derives from the survival of the 
underlying Russian strategic traditions adapted to the new realities of the 21st century. 
In the Russian military and political strategy, the technological and psychological 
means of IW have developed uninterruptedly and therefore in a much more integrated 
way. Also, the domestic political and regime security have generated a high degree of 
alert to threats coming from the information space. Interestingly, the economic and 
technological asymmetry of Russia did not allow for a developmental path based on 
technical foundations.
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